The State of Utah v. Clayton Burningham : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
The State of Utah v. Clayton Burningham : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Catherine M. Johnson; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Wallace A.
Lee; Garfield County Attorney; Attorney for Appellee.
Robert Breeze; Attorney for Defendant; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Burningham, No. 990592 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2253
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 990592-CA 
Priority No. 10 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON (5975) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0180 
(801)366-0180 
ROBERT BREEZE (4278) 
213 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City , Utah 84111 
(801) 322-2138 
WALLACE A. LEE (5306) 
Garfield County Attorney 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990592-CA 
v. : 
CLAYTON BURNINGHAM, : Priority No. 10 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
DAVID L. MOWER PRESIDING 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON (5975) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0180 
(801)366-0180 
ROBERT BREEZE (4278) WALLACE A. LEE (5306) 
213 East 300 South Garfield County Attorney 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)322-2138 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE . . 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OFFICER'S REQUEST THAT DEFENDANT PROVIDE 
A URINE SAMPLE WAS (1) SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION AND (2) REASONABLY RELATED TO THE 
OBJECTIVES OF PROBATION SUPERVISION 10 
A. Bench Probation Presents "Special Needs" Necessitating 
that Law Enforcement Officers Monitor Probation 
Compliance 11 
B. Police and Probation Officers May Collaborate in Probationer 
Searches 13 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM A - Order on Motion to Suppress Evidence 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 868 (1987) 11,14 
Owens v. Kellev. 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir.1982) 17 
STATE CASES 
People v. Bravo. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987) 17 
State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994) 10 
State v. Brandlev. 972 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1998) 10 
State v. Bryant. 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998) 10 
State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998) 15, \6 
State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996) 8 
State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137 (Utah App. 1997) 2 
State v. Johnson. 748P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987) 15, 16 
State v. Mitchell. 207 S.E.2d 263 (N.C. App. 1974) 17 
State v. Montgomery. 566 P.2d 1329 (Ariz. 1977) 17 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Perbix. 331 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1983) 17 
State v. Pizel. 987 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1999) 10 
State v. Ribe. 876P.2d403 (Utah App. 1994) 2 
State v. Sievers. 511 N.W.2d 205 (Neh. App. 1994) 17 
l l 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 2 
State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983) 14, 15 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1999) 1,3,4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(1999) 3,4 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1999) 1 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990582-CA 
v. : 
CLAYTON BURNINGHAM, : Priority No. 10 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence in the 
State's prosecution of him for one count of possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1999), one count of possession of a controlled substance (amphetamine), a third-
degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a class-B misdemeanor under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1999). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did an officer's request for a urine sample violate defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights, where officer had reasonable 
suspicion that defendant, a probationer, was using drugs, and 
where the search was reasonably related to the goals of 
probation? 
"We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in a 
bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a clearly 
erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Ribe. 
876 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). "Appellate courts . . . afford 
the trial judge 'a measure of discretion9 in applying the reasonable articulable suspicion 
standard to a particular set of facts." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah App. 
1997) (quoting Pena. 869 P.2d at 939). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend. IV provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1996, defendant was charged with one count of possession of marijuana, a class 
B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and one count of 
criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
106(2)(c)(iii)( 1999) (R. 88-89). He entered into a plea in abeyance for the marijuana 
possession charge (R. 85-87). According to the plea-in-abeyance agreement, his guilty 
plea would be held in abeyance for one year, and the charge would be dismissed upon his 
satisfactory compliance with certain obligations (id.). Defendant agreed, among other 
conditions, to refrain from the use of drugs, to obtain full-time employment or enroll in 
school, and to 
(g) Submit to searches of person and property for controlled substances at 
the request of any law enforcement officer at any time upon request. 
(R. 86). The one-year agreement was to take effect on "the date when this agreement is 
approved by the court" (R. 85). 
The trial court approved the plea-in abeyance agreement on September 19 ,1996 
(R. 89-91). At the same time, the court accepted defendant's guilty plea to the criminal 
mischief charge (R. 89). On the latter charge, the court suspended a one-year jail 
sentence, and placed defendant on 15 months unsupervised probation (R. 90). As a 
condition of probation, the court ordered 
5. That the Defendant shall submit to random tests of his breath 
or urine, and shall submit to searches of his home, person, vehicle and any 
other property under his control, at the request of any peace officer, without 
the necessity of probable cause or a warrant. 
3 
(id.). The probationary period would expire by its terms on December 19, 1997. 
On December 10, 1997, defendant was charged with the crimes at issue in this 
case: one count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a second-
degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (amphetamine), a third-degree felony under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1999) (R. 1-2). The information was later amended to reduce the charge for 
possession of methamphetamine to a third-degree felony (R. 26). 
After a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over for trial (R. 51-
52). Defendant moved on October 22, 1998 to suppress evidence of his drug possession 
(R. 57-62). The trial court denied the motion and entered written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law (R. 122-28, Addendum A). 
Defendant filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal on July 12, 
1999 (R. 134). This Court granted the petition on August 11, 1999. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime in the fall of 1998, Garfield County Deputy Sheriff James Perkins 
learned from a confidential informant that defendant had stashed a substantial amount of 
methamphetamine and marijuana in a closet of the apartment defendant shared with his 
brother and father at Panguitch Lake Resort (R. 138 at 10-11,13; 139 at 35). The drugs 
were reportedly supplied to defendant by a person Deputy Perkins knew to have had 
previous drug problems (R. 138 at 11). 
Defendant had entered into a plea in abeyance the year before for a drug offense 
(R. 85-87). In addition, he was on bench-supervised probation for criminal mischief (R. 
90). Deputy Perkins knew that, under the terms of the probation, defendant was required 
to submit to drug testing at the request of any peace officer (R. 138 at 10-11). 
One of Deputy Perkins' duties as a law enforcement officer was conducting drug 
tests of persons on probation (R. 139 at 49). He had performed more than 50 such tests 
the previous year (R. 139 at 50). 
Based on the information he had received about defendant's involvement with 
drugs, Deputy Perkins decided to meet with defendant and request a urine sample (R. 139 
at 49-50; R. 138 at 10-11). He and another officer went to the resort one evening in 
October (R. 138 at 12). As he walked up to the door, Deputy Perkins could see 
lrThe facts are taken primarily from transcripts of the preliminary hearing (R. 138 
and 139). 
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defendant through the window watching television (id.). The deputy knocked on the 
door several times (id.). A dog barked on the other side, but no one answered the door 
(id.). Deputy Perkins walked over to the window and looked inside (id). The lights and 
TV had been turned off (id). The deputy knocked on the door again, but received no 
reply (id). He could hear "what sounded like to me the dog being drug back across the 
floor... claws or fingernails kind of scratching across the floor. Then the dog quit 
barking" (id.). The officer said, "Come on Clay, open the door, I've already seen you" (R. 
138 at 13). Nothing happened (id.). Deputy Perkins left (id). 
The deputy returned to the resort the next day, and met defendant's brother Rick 
Burningham (R. 139 at 37). Rick admitted the officer into the living quarters, and they 
looked for drugs (R. 139 at 37-38). They found a film canister containing marijuana (R. 
139 at 38). 
Deputy Perkins came back to the lodge several more times and spoke to 
defendant's father and brother, but neither seemed to know where defendant was (R. 138 
at 13). The officer recalled, "my concerns grew that possibly . . . Clay was involved in 
some activity that he shouldn't be, some illegal activity of some kind that he was using 
drugs and didn't want to be tested" (id.). The officer also explained that "knowing that 
the defendant had eluded me or avoided me [t]hat made me very suspicious. I've had 
a fairly decent relationship with the defendant and there was no other reason that I could 
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think of that he could be avoiding me other than he was, possibly had been using some 
illegal substances" (R. 139 at 43). 
Deputy Perkins wrote a letter to defendant's then-attorney, who agreed to contact 
defendant to arrange a drug test (R. 138 at 14). However, the drug test was apparently 
never arranged. 
On October 15, 1998, Deputy Perkins found defendant at a dwelling about a 
quarter-mile from the lodge (id). Defendant met the officer at the door (R. 139 at 41). 
At Deputy Perkins' request, defendant accompanied him to the deputy's vehicle (R.139 at 
42). Deputy Perkins advised defendant of his Miranda rights, but did not arrest him or 
tell him that he was not free to leave (id., R. 139 at 43,45). The officer told defendant he 
suspected that defendant had been using drugs (R. 139 at 47). The officer then drove 
defendant down to the lodge in search of a bathroom, not realizing that the water supply 
to the lodge was turned off (R. 139 at 45). 
When they stopped at the lodge, the officer repeated defendant's Miranda rights a 
second time (R. 139 at 46). Then, he requested a urine sample (id.). The officer did not 
tell defendant that defendant was required to submit to the test (R. 139 at 45-46). 
Defendant admitted to the officer that he had smoked marijuana a couple of weeks 
before (R. 138 at 15, R. 139 at 48). He agreed to be tested, and urinated into a sample 
container the deputy provided (R. 138 at 14-15). As they sat in his patrol vehicle, Deputy 
Perkins field-tested the sample (R. 138 at 15). Defendant's urine revealed the presence of 
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THC and methamphetamine (i(L). The officer told defendant of the test results, and, to 
confirm the test's accuracy, conducted a second test (id.). That test, too, was positive 
(14). 
In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that the probation condition that he 
submit to random searches of his person and property violated the Fourth Amendment (R. 
80-81). He further maintained that Deputy Perkins used on the probation search 
condition to evade the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (R. 82-83). The 
trial court ruled that under State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433,437-38 (Utah App. 1996), the 
probation condition authorizing random searches of defendant was "illegal because it did 
not require the defendant to give a sample of breath or urine to one acting with reasonable 
suspicion" (R. 126, Addendum A). Nevertheless, the court held that the search was 
lawful because the officer had reasonable suspicion (R. 127-28). In the court's words: 
His suspicions were reasonable because he could articulate them 
(namely, the officer told me about substances and the name of a person 
[from whom defendant received the substances]) and he could articulate 
their relationship to the defendant (namely, that defendant had the 
substances and was associated with the person). 
. . . The defendant avoided the officer, whose suspicions were 
heightened. 
In a week, the officer made personal contact with the defendant and 




Responding to defendant's contentions that, in the court's words, "probation can 
only be supervised by a probation officer, that a policeman is not a probation officer, and 
that role-confusion is illegal," the court wrote, "Each of these contentions is rejected. 
Bench (or, unsupervised) probation is specifically allowed by statute. The Judicial 
Branch of government in Utah has no police or investigative officers and must rely on the 
Executive Branch for these functions, which include the investigation of probation 
violations" (R. 128). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although defendant does not contest that Deputy Perkins had reasonable suspicion 
that defendant had violated the terms of his bench probation, defendant maintains that the 
deputy improperly evaded the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement when he 
requested and received a sample of defendant's urine to conduct a drug test. Defendant 
contends that only a probation officer is authorized to conduct a search of a probationer. 
Defendant's argument does not acknowledge that defendant did not have a probation 
supervisor, nor that the trial court depended on police officers to monitor defendant's 
compliance with the terms of his probation. Probation in general, and bench probation in 
particular, present "special needs" which justify departure from the usual requirement that 
a search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant. Here, the search was supported by 
reasonable suspicion and was reasonably related to the objectives of probation 
9 
supervision, namely, protection of the public and deterrence of wrongdoing. Therefore, 
the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER'S REQUEST THAT DEFENDANT 
PROVIDE A URINE SAMPLE WAS (1) SUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND (2) REASONABLY RELATED 
TO THE OBJECTIVES OF PROBATION SUPERVISION 
Defendant argues that the officer impermissibly acted as a "stalking horse" when 
he requested that defendant, a bench probationer, submit to a urinalysis. Appellant's 
Brief at 8. Although he does not appear to dispute the trial court's conclusion that the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the test, defendant apparently contends that 
law enforcement officers are not authorized to conduct such searches of probationers 
pursuant to court-ordered conditions of bench probation.2 
2Defendant argues that the search violated his rights under both the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah constitution. Since he has failed to 
provide "independent authority, analysis, or argument" as to the state constitutional claim, 
this Court should decline to reach it. State v. PizeL 987 P.2d 1288, 1289 n. 1 (Utah App. 
1999); State v. Brandlev. 972 P.2d 78, 81 n.3 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 
984, 988-89 (Utah App. 1994). 
Similarly, the last sentence of defendant's brief requests suppression of 
defendant's self-incriminating statements. Appellant's Brief at 9. Defendant has failed to 
address in his brief why, since the statements were made after defendant received two 
Miranda warnings, suppression of the statements is an appropriate remedy. 
Consequently, the claim is inadequately briefed and this Court should not consider it. 
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. 
Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998). 
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As a preliminary matter, defendant maintains in Point I of his brief that the 
probation order ' s provision that defendant submit to vvlial ill I dant terms "search on 
"iiltiiuii I1"' r« iilllii IMI I  III illiiiiinil iiiiiii Iiii1. .iili! i Il iiiilll Il 111 Idlndiirif ' i l.i i ill lh.it | iiiil, 
holding that " the order imposing those conditions was uiwgui uv/tuuov 11 vnvi not require 
the defendant to give a sample of breath or urine to one acting with reasonable suspicion" 
court nevertheless uph e search on the ground that, regardless o; uie 
ill j . Given the trial cour t ' s hold idt the random search provision w as illegal, this 
case presents no real issue of whether probationers may lawfully be subjected to random 
searches. For purposes ° appeal nt Vunv. u ^ s not contest the trial coui t' s holding. 
Z ::: i 11: I: i: 1 ^  " ::11 i ::: t a ::I dress th z i nattei 
**• L>cnvn i nmauuii i i events "Special .iwvia^ Necessitating that Lav* 
Enforcement Officers Monitor Probation Compliance. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has written that: 
Although we usually require that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a 
warrant (and thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution says 
warrants must be), we have permitted exceptions when "special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable cause requirement impracticable " " \ State's operation of a 
probation system presents "special needs" beyond normal law 
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and 
probable-cause requirements." 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 481 11 S K6K, K71 -74 (19871 {<|\\ >iing New Jersey v. J .L.u., 111'" ' 
11 
U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackman, J. concurring in judgment) (other internal citation 
omitted)). 
Utah law specifically grants sentencing judges the discretion to place persons 
convicted of criminal offenses on bench-supervised probation: 
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty . . . or conviction of any crime or offense, the 
court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999). 
In exercising its discretion to place a defendant on bench probation, the sentencing 
court may be motivated by a number of factors. For example, the judge may believe that 
the defendant requires a lesser degree of monitoring and supervision than a defendant 
committed to the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. Or, the judge may place 
the defendant on bench-supervised probation in order to preserve the ability to personally 
review the probationer's progress on a periodic basis. Regardless of the reason the court 
chooses to place the defendant on bench probation, however, the court remains vested 
with the power to impose reasonable probation conditions on a defendant convicted of a 
crime. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(x) (1999) ("While on probation, and as a 
condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant.. .comply with other 
terms and conditions the court considers appropriate"). The court retains an interest, as 
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does Ih ifMll nl 'i,ni it 1 i IIII iiih in,)' flhiiil u ilrlnnliiiil ir illiiriill i|iiiM iif'irt'iiahili 1 
ttiat tiiw ^xwiwit 's continued presence in the community will not pose a danger to the 
community. 
:
'. . As the trial court, noteo. ,via, , government IIIIIII I llah has no 
puln i1 ir IIIIIII1' rstigatke ofllori - .iml IIIIIII I IIII \\ IIIIIIII lliiii Isruili Mi IIIIIII 11 lor these tunifions, 
vviwi include the in\ estigation of probation violations' (R. 128). ' Die court's 
observation was correct V rl ile agency-supervised probation systems present "special 
neec. . .asti t> nig departure from the- usual requirement that searches be conducted 
] * ; 
"•Spe cJa | n e e ( J s . " Xhw JV111V11V11 
!g
 c o u r t does not ha*. its who c~ — 0 — 
suspected w rongdoing and confirm,, whether a defendai it Is complying with, probation,, 
requirements. The special needs of bench probation, i equii e tl lat judges be allow ed to rely 
probation. 
B. Police and Probation Officers May Collaborate in Probationer Searches. 
Defendant suggests that a police officer may not conduct a warrantless search of a 
>st
 I * T*, * tlv addressed 
the issue of whether, in the case of a probationer who is not supe
 y ,nc Dep 
of Corrections, a law enforcement officer may conduct warrantless drug testing supported, 
by reasonable suspicion 11 vever, recognizing llutl (he objectives oi law" enlurcen I 
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and probation supervision may overlap, the courts have approved reasonable-suspicion 
searches conducted by police and probation or parole officials acting in collaboration. In 
this case, the officer's motivation in conducting the search was consistent with both sets 
of objectives. Therefore, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that probationers do not enjoy "'the 
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly 
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.'" Griffin. 483 U.S. at 874 
(1987) (quoting Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). Probation represents 
one point on a "continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in 
a maximum security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service." Id. 
"[T]he importance of [probation] supervision has grown as probation has become an 
increasingly common sentence for those convicted of serious crimes. Supervision, then, 
is a 'special need' of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that 
would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large." Id, at 875 (internal citation 
omitted). In Griffin, the Court ruled that the warrant requirement is "impracticable" with 
respect to probationers and approved a warrantless search of a probationer's residence 
based on reasonable suspicion.3 Id. at 875-76. 
3
"[R]easonable suspicion requires no more than that the authority acting be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant a belief in the conclusion mooted-in this instance, that a 
condition of parole has been violated." Velasquez. 672 P.2d at 620 n. 5 (quoting U.S. v. 
Scott. 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
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I o n iiin coi it t" s i easoning in State v. 
Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 ^blaii i ^ o ^ ^ Velasquez, ^ohce officers suspected that the 
defendant and his roommate, both parolees, were dealing in drugs. IJ at 1256. Realizing 
that they did not have probable cause for a search warrant t , , .,.vv m | { | j y i { ( ) c 
d e p a i l i i m i l iilllii m ill . Ill ill ill iiiilliill In1 In I H J ! H M T I Illii | M I I I I I il llic |i HI Ii <li |i ill in Mint 
w o u l d c o n d u c t a s e a r c h . I d a t 1 2 5 7 . P a r o l e o f f i c e r s S e a T v i i W l * U 1 V U U U l U l i V H V u i i u i v u a u 
weapons implicating Ve
 x ez in a murder for which he was later convicted IcL ill 
1256-57. 
:: i I 1:1 le fact tl lat pai olees en )o] a dii i: linished expectatioi i :: i 
pi ivacy, nciu iuai search of a parolee's residence need only be supported by a 
reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole violation or a crime, and 
that (2) the search must be "reasonably related to the pai ole officer" s dut> .' '" I d at 1260; 
529-30 (Utah ^ pp 1998) The court rejected the defendant's claim on appeal that the 
parole officers were merely acting as a tool of the police, ruling that "[a] parole officer's 
search of aparolee , . . is not unlawful just because il i .ill I in In i ill I llic police, or 
criminal prosecution." I d at 1262. 
The court followed the two-part test articulated in Velasquez in State v. Johnson, 
~U iuO * i v.,ic hat case... police inlonii I llllli Il< Ii in Illiiiiiiiill s parole olticer 
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that they had a warrant for the defendant's arrest on forgery charges. Id at 1071. The 
next day, a police officer and the parole officer went to Johnson's house, performed a 
warrantless search, and arrested him. Id. As in Velasquez, the court rejected Johnson's 
claim that the parole officer acted as the agent of the police: 
[I]t is of no consequence that Officer Shepard [the parole officer] took no 
action to search Johnson's quarters until Officer Jones [the police officer] 
told Officer Shepard of the arrest warrant Although we have warned 
that police officers may not use parole officers simply as a means of 
avoiding the warrant requirements to conduct random searches, that does 
not mean that police officers and parole officers are precluded from 
cooperating when the police have obtained an arrest warrant for the parolee. 
. . . [T]here was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police and the 
parole officers. Consequently, there was nothing improper either in the 
decision to conduct the warrantless search or in the joint effort between 
Shepard and Jones. 
Id at 1072-73. 
This Court has similarly upheld the legality of warrantless probationer searches that 
result from police-probation officer cooperation. In State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525 (Utah 
App. 1998), the Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's residence by police 
and probation officers was based upon reasonable suspicion and did not offend the Fourth 
Amendment.4 Id. at 529-60. This Court also held that, under the second part of the test 
articulated in Velasquez and Johnson, the search was reasonably related to the probation 
officers' duties "to protect the public and prevent Davis from violating his probation." Id. 
4
"This Court has noted that the reasonable suspicion standard applies to searches 
of both probationers and parolees." Davis. 965 P.2d at 529 n.2 (citations omitted). 
16 
at 530-31. 
Application of the principles set forth " ™uez. Johnson, and Davis supports 
tin 1 iii I illness ill IJ11 sum li in linn I in ! lln III ill! ml nn III 111I  i il, 
•fhe search was supported by reasonable suspicion, a fact not challenge. 
The officer had received an informant's tip that defendant had possession of a large 
. quantity of drugs, and had found marijuana in the living quarters d ^r,Ai,^ - • .;c 
1 
with whom he had pre\ IOUSIV had a "decent" relationship (R. 139 at 43). Those 
"circumstances gave rise to the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated 
his probation conditions and was involved in criminal activity. 
because, under Davis, it was undertaken to "protect the public and pre vent [defendant] 
from violating his probation," The fact that Deputy Perkins was not a probation, officer 
assigned to supervise defendant's probation should not mak i i ;he search 
5Although defendant cites cases from other jurisdictions, those cases do not control 
this court. None of defendant's cases holds categorically that a law enforcement officer's 
warrantless search of a probationer cannot, under the law of this state, reasonably relate to 
the goals of probation. Furthermore, other courts have held that warrantless searches of 
probationers by law enforcement (as opposed to probation) officers do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. See, &&, People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 336-37 (Cal. 1987); State 
v. Perbix. 331 N.W.2d 14, 20 (N.D. 1983): Owens v. Kelley. 681 F.2d 1362,1369 (11th 
Cir.1982); State v. Montgomery. 566 P.2d 1329,1331 (Ariz. 1977); State v. Sievers. 511 
N.W.2d205.™7nsieh Ann 1 QQd): State v. Mitchell 207 S F ?d 2M ? 6 4 f N r Ann 
1974) 
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automatically suspect. As Velasquez, Johnson, and Davis demonstrate, once a probation 
officer has developed reasonable suspicion that a probationer has violated his probation 
broken the law, the officer may conduct an investigation of the wrongdoing in furtherance 
of the officer's goal of protecting the public and deterring criminal conduct. Deputy 
Perkins did no more. 
Deputy Perkins had reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved with illegal 
drugs - a clear violation of defendant's probation. He attempted unsuccessfully to arrange 
the search through defendant's attorney (R. 138 at 14). He was careful to advise defendant 
of his Miranda rights twice before requesting the urine sample (R. 138 at 43, 46). He did 
not act arbitrarily or capriciously, and did not request the urine sample to harass or 
intimidate defendant (see R. 138 at 14-15; 139 at 41-43, 45-48). The record indicates that 
he did not pressure or coerce defendant into submitting to the test (see id.). Although he 
admitted that the search furthered his investigation, he also stated that he asked for the 
urine sample to monitor defendant's compliance with the conditions of his probation (R. 
139 at 48-49). His goals in conducting the search did not differ from the goals a formally-
designated probation officer would have had in Officer Perkins' situation. He acted as a 
probation officer would have acted under the circumstances. 
Although defendant posits an arbitrary and artificial distinction between law 
enforcement investigations and probation investigations, such a distinction is not 
supported by the facts of this case. This was not an investigation unrelated to defendant's 
18 
probation. I he "law em ^ment investigation" about • I: lich defendant complaii is K as ii i 
rcnht in irr rJi gallon nl i [HHIHIIUII I IOI idoii Deputy FVihits < onJiuMrd flu 
inveoii5cition in a cautious, reasonable manner, and did nut dtpoit hum the standai Jl1 f 
conduct that would be expected of a formally-designated probation officer. Under the 
circumstances presenl l " Lit, (lie otiicei s conduct mc ' et forth in Velasquez. 
id Johnson h 11 1111 i » 1 1 IIIn I  P M ii 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 f • i p 1 1 1 1 1 \\ f i <»i i t * r 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESriA il-l Li- \ Sv i> - - ' - i" tins -• *\,v- :•» . \ -- • y-^-y vy— , 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GFNFP *-.\ 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. 1 !• • I " I1 Jdi . i . t f i i 111 i, v.upni ispcl |" l i i11 i l i I'revioi. • 
an .*t,supervised plea in 
T
 ^r possessing any 
criminal conviction. He was also subject to the te 
abeyance agreement, that required him to . *. 
i (in mi ill mi illlln! s n l i I.iiii'i i" S p e c i f i c a l l y . 
1 • Duri i IJJ 111 term of this plea in abeyance agreement, defendant shall 
comply with the following obligations:... Submit to searches of person 
and property for controlled substances at the request of any law 
enforcement officer at any time upon request; and 
2. That the Defendant shall submit to ran :l : ;iri 11: 2 sts of his breath or urine, and 
shall submit to searches of his home, person, vehicle and any other 
property under his control, at the request of any peace officer, without the 
necessity of probable cause or a warrant. 
nanFft OMMnnnMTnsTTPPPrgg wmFMrF cnifinnnsQ p a g ^ 
2. No probation officer was assigned to supervise the defendant. 
3. James D. Perkins, Jr. is a deputy sheriff of Garfield County, Utah. He knew about 
the terms of defendant's probation and plea agreement. 
4. In or around the first week in October, 1997, Sgt. Perkins received information 
from a confidential informant that the defendant was in possession of illegal 
drugs, particularly methamphetamine and marijuana, and that the defendant was 
involved with Terry Messer, a known drug user in Garfield County. Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript, (hereinafter referred to as "PHT") at 10-11. 
5. Sgt. Perkins began looking for the defendant to request a urine sample for testing. 
Id. 
6. On the night of October 7,1997, Sgt. Perkins went to the defendant's residence at 
Panguitch Lake Resort to request a urine test. When he first arrived, Sgt. Perkins 
looked through a window. He saw the defendant sitting and watching television. 
However, when Sgt. Perkins knocked at the door, the television set and lights 
went off, and though he knocked and shouted several times, the defendant did not 
come to the door. PHT, at 12-13. 
7. Over the next week Sgt. Perkins continued to attempt to locate the defendant but 
was unsuccessful. PHT, at 13-14. 
8. On October 15,1997, Sgt. Perkins was able to find the defendant at a cabin in the 
9902171f« 
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Panguitch Lake area. Sgt. Perkins read the defendant his Miranda warnings and 
requested a urine sample. The defendant admitted he had been smoking 
marijuana, and that the test would probably reveal that fact. PHT, at 9-10; 14-15. 
9. The defendant provided a sample of his urine. Sgt. Perkins field tested the urine 
and the results indicated the presence of both THC, a metabolite of marijuana, and 
methamphetamine. PHT, at 15. 
10. Sgt. Perkins preserved the urine sample and sent it to the Toxicology Laboratory 
at the Utah Department of Health. The urine sample was tested at the Toxicology 
Laboratory, and the results indicated 112 nanograms per milliliter of THC-COOH 
Metabolite, 1.1 micrograms per milliliter of amphetamine, and 2 micrograms of 
methamphetamine. PHT, at 15. 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW 
The law that applies to this scenario is found in both legislative enactments and injudicial 
pronouncements. The legislative enactments are found in sections 77-18-1 and 77-2a-3, Utah 
Code. 
Law#l. On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. Section 77-18-1(1), Utah Code. 
9902171 ga 
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Law #2. On... conviction of any crime..., the court may suspend the imposition or 
execution of sentence and place the defendant... on bench probation under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Section 77-18-l(2)(a)(iii), Utah Code. 
Law #3. The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has continuing 
jurisdiction over all probationers. Section 77-18-l(2)(b)(ii), Utah Code. 
Law #4. While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant ...may 
be required to ... comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate.... Section 77-18-l(8)(a)(x), Utah Code. 
Law #5. The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement... order the defendant to comply with any 
other conditions which could have been imposed as conditions of probation upon 
conviction and sentencing for the same offense. Section 77-2a-3(5)(e), Utah Code. 
Law #6. Probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled, but only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
[probation] restrictions. Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 US 868,97 L.Ed.2d 709,107 
S.Ct. 3164 (United States Supreme Court, 1987). 
Law #7. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a 
probation officer have reasonable suspicion before commencing a warrantless 
9902171j» 
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search of a probationer's residence. State v Ham. 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 43,910 
P.2d 433,1996 Utah App. LEXIS 6 (Case No. 950062-CA, COURT OF 
APPEALS OF UTAH, 1996) 
Law #8. Even if defendant's probation agreement had not required reasonable 
suspicion..., [t]his requirement is applicable regardless of the language contained 
in defendant's probation agreement. State v. Ham, supra. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant was on probation on October 1,1997. He was duty-bound to conform his 
conduct to that of a law-abiding citizen, as all others are required to do, plus he was bound by 
certain conditions of probation. 
Those conditions of probation had been imposed by this Court, acting through the 
undersigned as Judge. When the conditions were imposed, the Court intended to require the 
defendant to give a sample of breath or urine at any time and for any reason, including no reason. 
It now appears that the order imposing those conditions was illegal because it did not 
require the defendant to give a sample of breath or urine to one acting with reasonable suspicion. 
Because of Laws 7 and 8, it is incumbent on the court to interpret the probation order and the 
plea-in-abeyance agreement as though they read: 
1. During the term of this plea in abeyance agreement, defendant shall 
comply with the following obligations:... Submit to searches of person 
and property for controlled substances at the request of any law 
9902171.gi 
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enforcement officer at any time upon request reasonable suspicion: and 
2. That the Defendant shall submit to random tests of his breath or urine, and 
shall submit to searches of his home, person, vehicle and any other 
property under his control, at the request of any peace officer, without the 
necessity of probable cause or a warrant but only upon reasonable 
suscirifln. 
I will now attempt to interpret the order and agreement accordingly. 
The analysis goes like this: Defendant was on probation. A policeman knew about the 
probation and conditions thereof. 
The policeman received a tip from a confidential informant about defendant. If the tip 
were true, then defendant had (1) violated probation, and (2) committed a crime. 
The policeman was suspicious of defendant. His suspicions were reasonable because he 
could articulate them (namely, the officer told me about substances and the name of a person) 
and he could articulate their relationship to the defendant (namely, that defendant had the 
substances and was associated with the person). 
The policeman found the defendant, but was unable to make personal contact with him. 
The defendant avoided the officer, whose suspicions were heightened. 
In a week, the officer made personal contact with the defendant and seized some of his 
urine. The defendant made voluntary, incriminating statements. 
The conclusion of this analysis is that the officer acted with reasonable suspicion. 
The defendant has directed the Court's attention to a portion of a treatise by Professor 
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Wayne LaFave and to the Utah Supreme Court opinion of State v Johnson 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 
1987). I have read both, but am unconvinced of their analytical value in this situation. The 
defendant uses them in an effort to convince the Court that probation can only be supervised by a 
probation officer, that a policeman is not a probation officer, and that role-confusion is illegal. 
Each of these contentions is rejected. Bench (or, unsupervised) probation is specifically 
allowed by statute. The Judicial Branch of government in Utah has no police or investigative 
officers and must rely on the Executive Branch for these functions, which include the 
investigation of probation violations. 
The motion to suppress should be denied. Mr. Lee is appointed to draft an appropriate 
order and to submit it for execution by following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
Dated this 3 o day of February, 1999. 
A M ^ 
SXVItfL. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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